Sourced from leak-site trackers — reflects the group's claim of a victim, not a confirmed breach.
Rows marked inferred are OSINT-extracted enrichment for actors without a MITRE Group ID — treat as analyst assessment, not authoritative ATT&CK attribution.
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Observed use |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1005 ↗inferred | Data from Local System | Collection | steals data for its Tor leak site (SentinelOne) |
| T1567 ↗inferred | Exfiltration Over Web Service | Exfiltration | exfiltrates stolen data for extortion (SentinelOne) |
| T1486 ↗inferred | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact | double-extortion encryptor (SentinelOne) |
| T1490 ↗inferred | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact | ransomware recovery inhibition (SentinelOne) |
| T1078 ↗inferred | Valid Accounts | Initial Access | access via access-broker/valid-credential ecosystems (SentinelOne) |
Regional co-occurrence is association, not prediction. These techniques appeared alongside Trigona's activity across the tracked MENA roster — a TIE-style association computed on our corpus (not CTID's model), not a prediction of the next move. Ranked by (over-representation among actors like this one vs. the roster base rate, damped when few actors back it), so neither a merely-common technique nor a tiny-sample coincidence floats to the top. A hunting lead only; never recorded as observed. ICS techniques are excluded.
Which Microsoft 365 controls protect, detect, or respond to this actor's techniques — from the CTID Mappings Explorer (technique-level). Strength: significant / partial / minimal.
Defensive techniques that counter Trigona's TTPs, from MITRE D3FEND. The ATT&CK↔D3FEND link is mitigation-mediated — treat these as candidate countermeasures, not prescriptions.