Rows marked inferred are OSINT-extracted enrichment for actors without a MITRE Group ID — treat as analyst assessment, not authoritative ATT&CK attribution.
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Observed use |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1485 ↗inferred | Data Destruction | Impact | wiped data at Bank Sepah and Iranian critical systems (FDD/CCDCOE) |
| T1561 ↗inferred | Disk Wipe | Impact | destructive wiper operations against Iranian targets (Picus/FDD) |
| T1565.001 ↗inferred | Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation | Impact | manipulated fuel-distribution and steel-plant safety systems for physical effect (public reporting) |
| T1657 ↗inferred | Financial Theft | Impact | destroyed ~$90M on the Nobitex exchange by sending funds to unspendable addresses (NBC/FDD) |
Regional co-occurrence is association, not prediction. These techniques appeared alongside Predatory Sparrow's activity across the tracked MENA roster — a TIE-style association computed on our corpus (not CTID's model), not a prediction of the next move. Ranked by support-adjusted lift (over-representation among actors like this one vs. the roster base rate, damped when few actors back it), so neither a merely-common technique nor a tiny-sample coincidence floats to the top. A hunting lead only; never recorded as observed. ICS techniques are excluded.
Which Microsoft 365 controls protect, detect, or respond to this actor's techniques — from the CTID Mappings Explorer (technique-level). Strength: significant / partial / minimal.
Defensive techniques that counter Predatory Sparrow's TTPs, from MITRE D3FEND. The ATT&CK↔D3FEND link is mitigation-mediated — treat these as candidate countermeasures, not prescriptions.