Sourced from leak-site trackers — reflects the group's claim of a victim, not a confirmed breach.
Rows marked inferred are OSINT-extracted enrichment for actors without a MITRE Group ID — treat as analyst assessment, not authoritative ATT&CK attribution.
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Observed use |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1005 ↗inferred | Data from Local System | Collection | steals data before encryption for extortion (Group-IB) |
| T1486 ↗inferred | Data Encrypted for Impact | Impact | Go-based encryptor (ChaCha20/RSA-OAEP) for Windows and Linux/ESXi (Group-IB) |
| T1490 ↗inferred | Inhibit System Recovery | Impact | double-extortion ransomware inhibits recovery (Group-IB) |
| T1489 ↗inferred | Service Stop | Impact | stops services for ESXi encryption (Group-IB) |
| T1021.002 ↗inferred | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares | Lateral Movement | encrypts network shares over SMB (Group-IB) |
Regional co-occurrence is association, not prediction. These techniques appeared alongside Eldorado's activity across the tracked MENA roster — a TIE-style association computed on our corpus (not CTID's model), not a prediction of the next move. Ranked by (over-representation among actors like this one vs. the roster base rate, damped when few actors back it), so neither a merely-common technique nor a tiny-sample coincidence floats to the top. A hunting lead only; never recorded as observed. ICS techniques are excluded.
Which Microsoft 365 controls protect, detect, or respond to this actor's techniques — from the CTID Mappings Explorer (technique-level). Strength: significant / partial / minimal.
Defensive techniques that counter Eldorado's TTPs, from MITRE D3FEND. The ATT&CK↔D3FEND link is mitigation-mediated — treat these as candidate countermeasures, not prescriptions.