Rows marked inferred are OSINT-extracted enrichment for actors without a MITRE Group ID — treat as analyst assessment, not authoritative ATT&CK attribution.
| Technique | Name | Tactic | Observed use |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1056.001 ↗inferred | Input Capture: Keylogging | Collection | Backdoor.Cadelspy logs keystrokes (Symantec) |
| T1113 ↗inferred | Screen Capture | Collection | Cadelspy captures screenshots (Symantec) |
| T1123 ↗inferred | Audio Capture | Collection | Cadelspy records via microphone (Symantec) |
| T1005 ↗inferred | Data from Local System | Collection | Cadelspy steals documents (Symantec) |
| T1115 ↗inferred | Clipboard Data | Collection | Cadelspy steals clipboard data (Symantec) |
| T1025 ↗inferred | Data from Removable Media | Collection | Cadelspy monitors removable drives (Symantec) |
Regional co-occurrence is association, not prediction. These techniques appeared alongside Cadelle's activity across the tracked MENA roster — a TIE-style association computed on our corpus (not CTID's model), not a prediction of the next move. Ranked by support-adjusted lift (over-representation among actors like this one vs. the roster base rate, damped when few actors back it), so neither a merely-common technique nor a tiny-sample coincidence floats to the top. A hunting lead only; never recorded as observed. ICS techniques are excluded.
Defensive techniques that counter Cadelle's TTPs, from MITRE D3FEND. The ATT&CK↔D3FEND link is mitigation-mediated — treat these as candidate countermeasures, not prescriptions.